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Pandemic Emotions: The Extent, Correlates, and Mental Health Consequences of Personal
and Altruistic Fear of COVID-19

Abstract

COVID-19 has had unprecedented effects on populations around the world. Given the
political and moral context of the pandemic and the nation’s response to it, this study sought to
assess the extent of American’s personal fear about the virus as well as their fear for others
(altruistic fear), identify potential predictors of these fears, and examine the mental health impact
of heightened COVID-19 fears. Overall, a majority of respondents worried about various
aspects of the virus, from being exposed to dying and reported often worrying about others,
including family, the elderly, and healthcare professionals. Building on the fear of crime
literature, we find that certain individuals, including those who believe they are at a high risk of
dying from the virus, those who closely follow news coverage of the pandemic, and those with
strong moral foundations, are likely to experience elevated fear and, possibly, its consequences.

Keywords: COVID-19, personal fear, altruistic fear, psychological distress, Moral Foundations
Theory, faith in Trump
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Originating first as an unexplained case of pneumonia in the Chinese city of Wuhan, the
novel coronavirus (COVID-19) quickly became a “public health emergency of international
concern” which has led to fear, worry, and anxiety among individuals around the world (Ahorsu
et al., 2020; Garfin et al., 2020; Kurl & Korzinski, 2020). As of this writing, more than 3.3
million people have contracted COVID-19 globally, and 235,000 of them have died. The
number of people in the United States known to have been infected by the virus has surpassed
one million with more than 64,000 deaths, and infection rates continue to increase daily (Johns
Hopkins, 2020).
The community spread and high mortality rates of COVID-19 have already dramatically
altered many aspects of our daily routines, including how we live, interact with each other, and
conduct businesses. In order to slow the spread of the virus, most states have imposed lockdown
and shelter-at-home measures that have disrupted the lives of millions of people and the
operations of businesses. Currently, international borders of the country are closed, air travel is
curtailed, schools and universities are providing instruction online, in-person church services are
cancelled, employees in various sectors have been ordered to work from home, and popular large
public events have been suspended (Erlanger, 2020). The economy has been paralyzed as global
stock markets have seen the greatest decline since the 2008 financial crisis (Clark, 2020). Most
troublingly, the U.S. health care system has been caught unprepared to handle the detection and
treatment of the virus (Ely, 2020).
National polls of public opinion indicate that COVID-19 is having a significant impact on
the attitudes and emotions of the U.S. population. For example, a national poll conducted by the
Pew Research Center from March 3-29, 2020 indicates that Americans see the spread of the
coronavirus as a top international threat, along with terrorism and nuclear weapons attacks
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(Poushter & Fagan, 2020). Due to the global media attention as well as the identification of atrisk populations, altruistic fear—fear for the safety of others (Warr & Ellison, 2000)—about the
coronavirus has become particularly prevalent. That is, the pandemic has caused Americans not
only to worry about themselves getting sick, but also to worry about the virus spreading into
their communities, affecting the health of their family members. For example, a Gallup Panel
survey conducted online between the dates March 30 and April 5, 2020 found that 75% of the
Americans are “very” or “somewhat” worried that they or someone in their family would be
exposed to coronavirus (McCarthy, 2020).
Feelings of anxiety, uncertainty, and the stress brought by the pandemic are normal in
these circumstances (Gordon, 2020). In fact, fear is an adaptive response in the presence of
danger; it is functional because it motivates us to engage in protective behavior. However,
excessive fear has been linked to negative outcomes, causing poor mental and physical health
(Haynes & Rader, 2015; Kubzansky & Kawachi, 2000), such as social withdrawal/isolation from
others as well as engaging in unnecessary avoidance and protective behaviors (e.g., stockpiling
of firearms) (Drakulich, 2015; Vacha & McLaughlin, 2000).
Fear of the coronavirus has also proved itself particularly capable of the same detrimental
impact that is already noted in the fear of crime literature. The randomness of the infection,
feelings of uncertainty about what could happen in the upcoming weeks (perceived lack of
control), coupled with the fact that there is currently no vaccine or preventative treatment have
led people to behave in ways that are disproportionate to the risk caused by this disease
(Robinson, 2020). Some of these reactions have been relatively benign, such as rushing to
grocery stores and pharmacies for panic buying of months’ worth of supplies including rice,
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toilet paper, hand sanitizers, surgical masks, gloves, face shields, and even respirators (Timsit,
2020; Wetsman, 2020).
Unfortunately, some other behaviors exhibited have been divisive and dangerous in
nature. For example, since the outbreak reached United States, anti-Asian and anti-immigrant
sentiments have been on the rise, as the virus was described distinctly by some high-level
officials, including the President, as the “Chinese virus” (Earle, 2020; Fischoff, 2020).
Additionally, some politicians have exploited the coronavirus crisis to intensify their attacks on
immigrants and refugees, arguing that the contagion occurred because of open borders and
migrants, even though experts repeatedly stated that the virus came to the United States by
travelers and tourists (Earle, 2020; Tepperman, 2020). Actions such as these, as well as the
partisan gap observed in reactions to COVID-19—with Republican governors being slower to
respond to the crisis than Democratic ones, Republicans being overwhelmingly more likely than
Democrats to believe that President Donald Trump’s response to the crisis has been excellent or
good, and Democrats viewing the virus as a more serious threat than Republicans—illustrate that
the coronavirus has become a moral and political issue (Adolph et al., 2020; Newport, 2020).
Furthermore, while the full psychological impact of the COVID-19 crisis is still
unknown, research on other macro-level stressors such as other pandemics, natural disasters, and
terrorism, suggests that excessive worry can produce even more severe physical and
psychological consequences (Garfin, Silver, & Holman, 2020; The Lancet, 2005). For example,
after a major earthquake hit Turkey in 1999, many survivors refused to go back into their homes
and instead lived in outdoor camps for several months. Therefore, it is important to understand
who is most at risk for experiencing excessive worry in order to address its consequences.
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In this context, we draw on data from a national survey to (1) evaluate levels of both
personal fear and altruistic fear about COVID-19 in the United States, (2) identify social patterns
in the experience of these fears, and (3) assess the impact that fear of the coronavirus has on
psychological well-being. We build our models of personal and altruistic fear based on the
vulnerability perspective within the fear of crime and terrorism literature and incorporate insights
from Moral Foundations Theory to address the moral and political aspects of the pandemic. We
then examine the implications of elevated fear of COVID-19 as a macro-level stressor with the
potential for mental health consequences. In doing so, we identify factors that contribute to
variation in the experiences of fear—both personal and altruistic—and its consequences.
Fear of COVID-19
The Significance of Fear
Fear is a primary emotion (Kemper 1987). It is universally experienced and provides the
basis upon which many more complex emotional experiences such as anxiety, panic, and terror,
are formed (Turner, 2014). Fear also has survival value—it signals danger or a threat to one’s
self-interest or social group and precipitates a fight-or-flight response (Kemper, 1987; Barbalet,
2001). Thus, in the context of the current coronavirus crisis, the experience of fear is functional
for individual and societal well-being. Fear may lead individuals to engage in behaviors such as
handwashing and social distancing that can limit the spread of illness. Conversely, fear of
disease may have undesirable consequences such as avoiding contact with health care services
when needed or scared but healthy individuals utilizing services when unneeded (Barrett &
Brown, 2008; McDonnell, Nelson & Schunk, 2012; Yang, 2008). On an individual level,
excessive disease-related fear can lead to more serious psychological distress, interference with
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cognitive processing, and diminished physical health (Garfin, Silver, & Holman, 2020; Richman,
Cloninger, & Rospenda, 2008; Shultz et al. 2016).
At the societal-level, fear can characterize an “emotion climate”—a climate of fear (de
Rivera 1992). Defined as “collective emotions experienced as a result of a society’s response to
its sociopolitical conditions” (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & Rivera, 2007, p. 443), emotion climates may
dominate the behaviors of the public (de Rivera, 1992). Although climates of fear can result
from transitional contexts, which are temporary in duration, the fear itself can have long term
impacts on society, lasting well beyond the context in which it developed (Bar-Tal, Halperin, &
de Rivera, 2007). Fear-based emotional climates can be seen among citizens of dictatorships or
in regions characterized by political violence or frequent terrorist attacks. Fear in these cases
serves to isolate individuals (de Rivera, 1992). In a similar way, the uncertainty caused by the
COVID-19 pandemic may lead to a climate of fear within the United States and across the globe.
Although governments have mandated social isolation in many regions, in a climate of fear,
social isolation will continue to persist after the risk of infection has substantially declined.
Furthermore, even in relatively secure environments, including the United States, social
scientists have noted the use of fear by politicians and the media to manipulate the public and
achieve political goals (Altheide, 2017; Best, 2018; Glassner, 1999; Stearns, 2006). In the case
of terrorism, for example, research has found positive associations between the extent of news
media consumption and fear of terrorism (Matthes, Schmuck, & von Sikorski, 2019; Nellis &
Savage, 2012). While research on the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic is only beginning to
emerge, in academic commentaries mental health experts have cautioned the research
community about the association between media consumption and fear of the virus (Asmudson
& Taylor, 2020; Garfin, Silver, & Holman, 2020). Indeed, analyses of survey data collected
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from an international convenience sample found a significant positive association between media
exposure and fear of COVID-19, net of demographic characteristics and perceived risk of
infection (Mertens et al., 2020).
Individual-level Predictors of Fear
An extensive body of criminological research has examined fear of crime, and more
recent studies have extended this research to understand fear of terrorism (Lane et al., 2014;
Nellis, 2009, Nellis & Savage, 2012). While crime (including acts of terrorism) and pandemics
are clearly distinct in their scale and origins, the uncertainty of both categories of adverse events
suggests the applicability of fear of crime models.1 In addition, as with crime, and terrorism
more specifically, infectious disease presents a potential to harm in a manner in which
individuals have little control. Indeed, the state of fear caused by the COVID-19 crisis has been
likened to the fear of terrorism. As described by Julianne Smith, former deputy national security
advisor to Vice President Joe Biden, “there is a similar sense of helplessness... You don’t know
when terrorism or the pandemic will strike, so it invades your personal life. With terror, you
worry about being in crowds and rallies and sporting events. It’s the same with the virus —
crowds spell danger” (Erlanger, 2020). Thus, in our effort to identify predictors of fear of
COVID-19, we draw on this criminological research on fear.
Fear of crime can be differentiated into two types—personal fear (fear for oneself) and
altruistic fear (fear for others) (Warr & Ellison, 2000). Although studies have found that
altruistic fear is more prevalent (Drakulich, 2015; Snedker, 2006), most fear of crime research
focuses on personal fear. Both types of fear are relevant in the case of COVID-19—individuals
may be concerned that they, themselves will become infected with the virus or that others will
suffer from virus-related consequences. In fact, the emphasis placed on social distancing,
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cautions regarding asymptomatic spread of the disease, and public health guidance to act as if
you are carrying the virus to limit infecting others (e.g., NYC.gov, 2020; CDCa, 2020), suggest
that altruistic fear may be particularly salient.
Vulnerability and Fear, Personal and Altruistic
Within the fear of crime literature, an extensive amount of research focuses on the
vulnerability perspective regarding personal fear. According to this perspective, personal fear of
crime is greater among individuals who are perceived to be more vulnerable to victimization
(Lane et al., 2014; Wyant, 2008). At the individual level, women experience greater fear of
crime relative to men, even if their actual risk of victimization may be low (Hale, 1996; Henson
& Reyns, 2015; Warr, 1984, 2000). Presumably, women may feel more threatened by crime due
to a perceived inability to defend themselves physically, with the threat of sexual or physical
assault especially concerning (Ferraro, 1995; Hirtenlehner & Farrall, 2014; Jackson, 2009).
Non-Whites and persons from lower socioeconomic status have also tended to report greater fear
of crime, though the research findings have been less clear for these variables than those for
gender (Lane et al., 2014). Likewise, early research had identified a positive association between
age and fear of crime, due to increasing physical vulnerability (LaGrange & Ferraro, 1989; Warr,
1984), though later research suggests a negative or curvilinear relationship between age and fear
(Chadee & Ditton, 2003; Farrall et al., 2000).
Studies of terrorism-related fear have identified similar patterns. For example, in a 2006
survey of residents of New York City and Washington, DC, Nellis (2009) found that women
reported greater fear of terrorism than men, and fear of terrorism was positively associated with
perceived risk of victimization. Similarly, in a 2018 national survey of Americans, Haner and
colleagues (2019) found women to be more fearful of terrorism than men. The survey also found

8

that fear of terrorism was more prevalent among non-Whites, those expressing emotional
vulnerability, and political conservatives (Haner, Sloan, Cullen, Kulig, & Jonson, 2019). Thus,
in addition to supporting the fear of crime literature, with women, non-Whites, and the
emotionally vulnerable being more fearful (Eisenman et al, 2009; Lane et al. 2014; Lorenc et al.,
2012), Haner and colleagues’ (2019) findings also indicate a political component to fear of
terrorism (Altheide, 2017; Gadarian, 2013; Jackson, 2011).
The studies that have examined altruistic fear of crime have also consistently found that
fear for others is gendered (Warr & Ellison, 2000). More specifically, women report greater fear
about crime for themselves and for their children than do men. On the other hand, men are more
fearful of crime for their spouse or significant other than are women (Drakulich, 2015; Haynes &
Rader, 2015; Nellis & Savage, 2012). In addition, within families, parental fear tends to be
directed more towards daughters than sons (Warr & Ellison, 2000). That females are more likely
to be the target of altruistic fear than males is consistent with the vulnerability perspective—
females are perceived as more vulnerable to victimization and thus deserving a greater focus of
one’s concerns (Drakulich & Rose, 2013). Despite having different antecedents, however, the
extant research suggests that both personal and altruistic fear may be associated with reduced
psychological well-being (Drakulich, 2015; Lorenc et al., 2012; Warr & Ellison, 2000).
Furthermore, beyond these demographic antecedents of fear of crime, research indicates
that an individual’s perception of risk of victimization is a substantial contributor to personal fear
of crime (Jackson, 2011; Warr, 2000), if not the “most important determinant of fear of
victimization” (Ferraro, 1995, p.60). That is, fear is higher among those who believe they are
likely to be victimized. Moreover, although much of the fear of crime literature examines direct
effects of demographic characteristics on fear, research suggests that women’s increased fear of
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crime may be due to their elevated perception of risk (Chataway & Hart, 2019; Jackson, 2009).
That is, women tend to believe they face a greater risk of victimization than men, which results
in their higher levels of fear of crime. Again, most of the focus has been placed on
understanding personal fear; however, a national survey of personal and altruistic fear of crime
found that perceived neighborhood safety, a proxy perceived risk, was significantly associated
with fear of crime for family and friends (Haynes & Rader, 2015). Given that the media
coverage of the pandemic as well as public health messaging has emphasized “at risk”
populations, perceived risk for others may likely affect altruistic fear (McCarthy, 2020).
The Political and Moral Context of COVID-19
As with the case of terrorism, noted above, as well as crime more generally (Beckett &
Sasson, 2004; Loo & Grimes, 2004), emerging research suggests that political factors are likely
to influence Americans’ fear of COVID-19. For example, following President Donald Trump’s
downplaying of the threat of the virus (Cillizza, 2020; Leonhardt, 2020), an analysis of statelevel responses to the pandemic revealed that states with Republican governors and those with
greater numbers of Trump supporters were slower than others to adopt social distancing policies
(Adolph et al., 2020). Likewise, recent survey data show that Republicans expressed less
concern about COVID-19 and were less likely to follow the recommendations of the Centers for
Disease Control than their Democrat counterparts (McCarthy, 2020), while analyses of cell
phone data illustrated significantly less compliance with social distancing guidelines in
predominantly Republican counties than in Democratic counties (Allcott et al., 2020).
Furthermore, the recent protests against statewide coronavirus stay-at-home orders, with
the chant “Give me Liberty or Give Me COVID-19” (e.g., Associated Press, 2020), suggest that
governmentally enforced restrictions on citizens has struck more deeply-rooted values. Thus, the
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coronavirus crisis also appears to have a moral component. As such, Moral Foundations Theory
(MFT) may provide insight into the psychological underpinnings of differential responses to the
coronavirus crisis (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt, 2012). According to MFT, moral concerns can be
categorized into the following five universal foundations: harm/care, fairness/reciprocity,
ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity (Haidt & Graham, 2007). The existence of
these foundations is innate, though an individual’s emphasis on each is shaped by culture, social
institutions, and experiences (Haidt et al, 2009). The first two foundations center on protecting
the individual (“individualizing foundations”)—having compassion for others and defending
civil liberties—while the other foundations locate moral concerns at the group level (“binding
foundations”)—sacrificing the self for group order, showing obedience to authority, and
maintaining normative behaviors (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). Empirical research suggests
that what we observe as political gaps in interpretations of social issues stems from divergence
on these moral foundations, with liberals tending to approach issues from an individualizing
perspective and conservatives tending to be more binding-oriented in their concerns (Graham et
al., 2009; Koleva et al., 2012; Milesi & Alberici, 2018; Wolsko, Ariceaga, & Seiden, 2016).
Although the research that links MFT to emotional experience has tended to focus on
moral emotions such as disgust (Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2012, Inbar et al., 2012) or anger
(Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011), the political context of the
coronavirus crisis in the United States suggests that experiences of personal and altruistic fear of
the virus may relate to these moral foundations. More specifically, we may expect that fear
about oneself or others becoming ill will be more salient for persons high on individualizing
foundations, which increase concern for human suffering (Süssenbach, Rees, & Gollwitzer,
2019). These fears surround the potential for harm to self or others caused by the virus as well as
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the need to respect the welfare of others by protecting oneself and social distancing (Clark et al.,
2017; Wolsko, Ariceaga, & Seiden 2016). Moreover, while those with a binding-orientation are
less concerned with the individual in general, following the authority of Donald Trump’s lead,
and his relatively dismissive approach to the crisis (e.g., Cilizza, 2020), may further decrease
personal and altruistic concerns among those who emphasize binding foundations. Therefore,
we seek to extend the extant research on socially patterned fears by applying these insights from
MFT and by examining the mental health impact of excessive fear of COVID-19.
Fear and Mental Health
As defined in the sociological literature, stressors are “conditions of threat, challenge,
demands, or structural constraints that, by the very fact of their occurrence or existence, call into
question the operating integrity of the organism” (Wheaton & Montazer 2010, p. 173) and, as
such can lead to psychological distress in individuals. A pandemic, as either a traumatic event to
those personally affected by illness or as a more general threat, meets this definition.
Furthermore, a pandemic is a stressor that occurs at the macro-level of social reality. Unlike the
case for stressors at the micro-level (e.g., divorce) or meso-level (e.g., neighborhood crime), with
macro-level stressors, “each member of the unit, by definition, is exposed at some level, although
the level of exposure may vary by time and place” (Wheaton et al., 2013, p. 307).
According to the stress process model, whether or not the presence of a stressor will
result in the experience of physical or psychological changes in an individual depends on
contextual factors (e.g., social circumstances or life experiences) (Pearlin & Bierman, 2013;
Wheaton & Montazer, 2010). As fear arises from the perception of threat, the intensity of fear
and worry about COVID-19 can signify the perceived threat of the virus (Malik et al., 2018;
Nellis, 2009; Richman et al., 2008). That is, the presence of elevated fear of COVID-19
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indicates virus-related stress. This stress, then, can lead to decreased mental health (Pearlin &
Bierman, 2013). Furthermore, variation in this fear experience, may correspond to variation in
the psychological outcomes of the perceived stress of COVID-19.
In the analyses that follow, we assess the extent of both personal and altruistic fear of
COVID-19 reported in our sample, social patterns in the experience of these fears, and the
association between coronavirus-related fear and decreased mental health. We build on the
research discussed above by evaluating the impact of structural vulnerability, perceived risk,
moral/political factors, and news awareness on personal and altruistic fear of COVID-19.
Methods
Sample
Respondents for this study were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk)
program for a national level survey that was fielded between March 28 th and 29th, 2020. MTurk
and other opt-in online surveys has become common in social science research due to their dataquality advantages—limiting interviewer effects, non-response, satisficing, and speeding (Anson,
2018; Hauser & Schwarz, 2016; Weinberg et al., 2014). At the time of our survey, 123,653
individuals had been diagnosed with COVID-19 within the United States and 2,135 Americans
had died due to the virus (New York Times, 2020). Furthermore, 26 states had put “stay-athome” orders in place, and warnings about social distancing were ubiquitous (Mervosh, Lu, &
Swales, 2020). MTurk allows respondents (“workers”) to opt-in to participation in activities
(human intelligence tasks, or HITs), including surveys, in exchange for small financial
incentives. For our survey, we limited respondents to those who had a 95% successful
completion rate for HITs and had completed over 500 HITs (Peer, Vosgerau, & Acquisti, 2014)
and were 18 years or older and resided within the United States.
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The final analytic sample was reduced from 1,000 to 990 respondents due to listwise
deletion of cases with missing values (<5%). The final sample was 68.8% White, 40.6% female,
45.4% married, with an average age of 38.37 years. This sample corresponds roughly to the to
the demographic composition of respondents to the 2018 American Community Survey, which
was 72.2% White, 50.8% female, 47.8% married, and 46.9 years old on average. Furthermore,
28.7% of the sample identified as Republican, which is close in comparison to the PEW
Research Center estimate of 26% of the American population being Republican.
—Insert Table 1 about here—
Dependent Variables
Personal Fear. We measured personal fear of COVID-19 with six items that evaluated
the respondent’s worry of various situations involving the virus (e.g., being exposed to the virus,
dying from the virus) using a four-item Likert scale ranging from “not worried at all” to “very
worried.” We combined the items to produce an averaged scale of personal fear (α = .901, factor
loadings: .527 to .899). See Table 2 for item wordings and responses.
The fear of crime literature frequently measures fear as a respondent’s extent of worry
about crime (Clay-Warner, 2014; Farrall, Jackson, & Gray, 2009). Warr and Ellison (2000)
explain that worry measures “anxiety about future victimization” rather than concern about an
immediate threat (p. 557). In the study of fear of COVID-19, it is most appropriate to assess
worry about future victimization, as the immediate threat of the virus to most Americans was
uncertain, particularly at the time of data collection. The use of worry to assess fear of
victimization is, accordingly, consistent with previous research (Brunton-Smith & Sturgis, 2011;
Lane & Meeker, 2000; Nellis, 2009).
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Altruistic Fear. We measured altruistic fear, or fear about others becoming ill from
COVID-19, using an averaged scale of seven items that evaluated the respondent’s frequency of
worry about other people becoming sick with the virus. Respondents rated each item using a
four-point Likert scale of the frequency of worry, which ranged from “very rarely” to “very
often” (α = .912, factor loadings: .781 to .854). See Table 2 for item wordings and responses.
This procedure of asking respondents to rate worry about listed individuals or groups of others is
consistent with the measurement of altruistic fear in the extant research (Drakulich, 2015; Warr
& Ellison, 2000).
Mental Health Harm. We assessed the mental health impact of COVID-19 by responses
to the following question: “Do you feel that worry or stress related to coronavirus has had a
negative impact on your mental health, or not?” “Yes” responses were coded as 1 and “no” was
coded as 0, so that a value of 1 indicates a perceived decline in mental health due to COVID-19.
Independent Variables
Vulnerability Factors. Following the fear of crime literature, we include the structural
vulnerability characteristics of gender, age, and race in our models. We coded self-identified
females as 1 and males as 0. Age is measured in years. We measure race dichotomously, with
Whites coded as 1 and non-Whites coded as 0.
Perceived Risk. Previous research has documented the tie between perceived risk of
victimization and fear (Nellis, 2009; Rader, May, & Goodrum, 2007). Thus, we include
perceived risk of dying from COVID-19 in our models. We assessed perceived risk by responses
to the question: “In your best judgment, what is the percent chance (or chances out of 100) that
each of the following would DIE if they GOT INFECTED with the coronavirus?” Participants
responded to this question for the following groups: you personally, the average American,
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children under 12, elderly people, people with an underlying medical problem, and people with
auto-immune disorders. The ordinal set of response options ranged from “under 1%” to “over
40%” on a seven-point scale. For the analyses of personal fear, we use responses to “you
personally,” and for the analyses of altruistic fear we use the average of responses to the other
groups (α = .864).
Political and Moral Context. We measure the political views of respondents in multiple
ways. First, we include respondents’ self-reported affiliation with the Republican Party (yes=1).
Second, we measure the political views of respondents with a five-point scale ranging from
“very liberal” to “very conservative” (Baranauskas & Drakulich, 2018; Enns & Ramiriez, 2018).
Third, due to the observed protests regarding personal liberty as well as research that suggests
Libertarians prioritize rationality over emotionality and score high on the moral concern of
liberty while ranking low on other concerns (Associated Press, 2020; Iyer et al., 2012), we use a
three-item Libertarian scale that evaluated respondents’ preference for Libertarian views (i.e.,
small government, free markets) verses non-libertarian views (i.e., greater government role).
Higher responses on this variable indicate more agreement with libertarian views (α = .739)
(Filindra & Kaplan, 2016). Fourth, to capture the unique impact of Trump’s presidential
influence (e.g., Haner et al., 2020), we include a measure of general faith in Trump. This is a
mean index based on five items that asked about general attitudes towards President Trump (e.g.,
“I believe that President Trump will make America great again.”) Respondents rated each
statement on a five-point scale (1= strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) (α = .968, factor
loadings: .923 to .958).
Finally, following Graham and colleagues’ (2009) assessment of MFT, we created
indices derived from 20 items that asked about moral foundations, each rated on a five-point
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scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The items included four variables for each of
the following five moral foundations: fairness/reciprocity (e.g., “Justice, fairness, and equality
are the most important requirements for a society”, α = .775, factor loadings: .468 to .773),
harm/care (e.g., “Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue”, α = .639,
factor loadings: .412 to .507), ingroup/loyalty (e.g, “People should always put their group’s
interests above their own personal interests”, α = .721, factor loadings: .434 to .791),
authority/respect (“Respect for authority is something all children need to learn”, α = .859, factor
loadings: .650 to .823), and purity/sanctity (“I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that
they are unnatural”, α = .924, factor loadings: .843 to .866). Factor analysis revealed that the
items loaded on the two expected factors, representing individualizing foundations (including
harm/care and fairness/reciprocity; factor loadings = .636 and .658) and binding foundations
(including ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity; factor loadings = .634 to .818).
Following previous research, we averaged the two individualizing indices to create an overall
individualizing foundations index (r=.527) and averaged the three binding indices to create an
overall binding foundations index (α = .794) (Malka et al., 2016; Smith et al., 2014; Van
Leeuwen & Park, 2009). The wording of each item is presented in the Appendix.
News Awareness. Since previous research documents a positive association between
adverse event-related news consumption and fear (Asmudson & Taylor, 2020; Garfin, Silver, &
Holman, 2020; Nellis & Savage, 2012), we include a measure of news awareness about the
COIVD-19 outbreak. Participants responded to the question: “How closely have you been
following news about the outbreak of the coronavirus strain known as COVID-19?” on a fourpoint scale that ranged from “not closely at all” to “very closely.”
Control Variables
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We include the following demographic controls in all models: education (measured
ordinally: 1 = “less than high school degree” to 7 = “Doctoral degree”), marital status (1 =
married , 0 = other), 2018 annual household income (measured ordinally: 1 = “0-$9,999” to 7 =
“$100,000+”), and identification with a religious group (1 = yes). We also include a control for
residing in the geographic South (1 = yes, 0 = no), as regional cultural and political factors, such
as increased adherence to Donald Trump’s messaging, may influence fear of COVID-19.
In addition, following Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) general theory of crime, research
has shown that low self-control is a consistent predictor of victimization (Kulig et al., 2019; Pratt
et al., 2014) and perceptions of risk and fear (Galliot, Meichel, & Baumeister, 2006), and thus
may relate to fear of COVID-19. Thus, we include a measure of low self-control, assessed with
the average of six items (e.g., “I often act on the spur of the moment without stopping to think”)
derived from Grasmick and colleague’s (1993). Respondents rated the items on a five-point
Likert scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree.” Higher values indicate lower
self-control (α = .875, factor loading: .723 to .818).
Finally, we include two variables to control for exposure to COVID-19. Respondents
answered “yes” (coded as 1) or “no” (coded as 0) to the following two questions: “To the best of
your knowledge, have any of your friends or family members been infected with the
coronavirus?” and “Do you believe that you have been infected with the coronavirus?”
Analytic Strategy
First, in order to assess the overall sense of concern about different aspects of the
COVID-19 situation, we examine frequencies of responses to each personal and altruistic fear
item. Second, we use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to predict personal fear and
altruistic fear by the sets of vulnerability characteristics, political factors, and control variables.
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We model these regressions in two steps. The first model includes the demographic
vulnerability characteristics, political factors, and control variables. The second model adds
perceived risk to the analysis—personal risk for personal fear, and risk for others for altruistic
fear. This strategy enables us to assess the impact of risk as a potential mediator of the
relationships between the independent variables and fear (Jackson, 2009, 2011). Third, in order
to assess the mental health impact of coronavirus fear, we estimate binary logistic regressions of
mental health harm in two models. First, we predict mental health harm with all independent
variables and controls. Then, we add the fear variables to the model. Across all models,
variance inflation factor scores ranged from 1.05 to 2.75, which suggest that multicollinearity
was not a concern in the analyses (Cohen et al., 2003).
It is necessary to note that our cross-sectional data do not enable us to make causal
interpretations of the relationships examined here. However, we can be confident that most of
our independent variables precede fear of COVID-19 (e.g., gender, age, political orientation),
and the extant research on fear of crime indicates that perceived risk is a key antecedent of fear
of victimization (Ferraro, 1995; Jackson, 2011; Warr, 2000).
Results
Table 2 reports the frequencies of responses to each personal and altruistic fear item. The
final column of the table shows the percentages of the sample that responded with “somewhat
worried” or “very worried” to the item. As shown in the top panel for the personal fear items,
most respondents were worried about COVID-19. Approximately three-fourths of the sample
was personally worried about being exposed being exposed to the virus (78% worried),
becoming sick from the virus (76% worried), and becoming seriously ill (72% worried). A
striking 61% of the sample was personally worried about dying from the virus. Furthermore,
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about 67% of the sample was worried about having long-term health problems due to the virus,
with 38% indicating that they were “very worried” about such long-term health effects. This
level of worry suggests a dominant presence of personal fear in the American population at the
time of data collection (March 28 — 29, 2020), notably early in the timeline of the course of
COVID-19 in the United States.
The bottom panel of Table 2 reports the statistics for the altruistic fear items. As
described above, respondents indicated the frequency of their worry about different groups of
people becoming sick from the virus; thus, the frequencies for altruistic fear reported in Table 2
are not directly comparable to those for personal fear. Nevertheless, as with personal fear, we
see a substantial amount of altruistic fear among those in our sample. About 6 out of 10
respondents reported that they worry “often” or “very often” about their family members, elderly
persons they know, and doctors and nurses. Half of the sample worried often about “people
across American” in general. Respondents had the least amount of overall worry for their
neighbors (35% worried) and persons in other countries (40% worried). Taken together, these
statistics reveal that COVID-19—and its potential effects on themselves and others—is a major
concern for most of our sample. Next, we examine potential sources of variation in this concern.
—Insert Table 2 about here—
Table 3 presents the results of the OLS regressions of personal fear and altruistic fear.
Overall, these analyses reveal that, consistent with the fear of crime literature, perceived risk of
dying from COVID-19 is the strongest predictor of personal fear of the virus (β = .266). Aside
from perceived risk, the analyses also reveal some expected patterns.
Among the vulnerability factors shown in Model 1 of Table 3, women report significantly
higher levels of personal fear of COVID-19 than men (β = .091), and Whites report significantly
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lower levels of personal fear than non-Whites (β = -.148). With inclusion of perceived risk of
COVID-19 in Model 2, however, the coefficient for female becomes non-significant. Additional
analyses (not shown), demonstrated that women perceive greater risk of dying from COVID-19
than men (b = .268, se = .107, p = .012), net of the other predictors. Together, these findings
suggest that women are more personally fearful about COVID-19 than men because they
perceive their risk of dying from the virus to be greater (Baron & Kenny, 1986). To confirm this
mediation effect, we used the PROCESS procedure in SPSS, developed by Hayes (2017). The
results illustrate a significant indirect effect of gender on personal fear through perceived risk
(Sobel test Z = 2.69, p < .01; full results are available upon request). Thus, these findings
support a mediation model of gender and fear (Jackson, 2009). Also, across both models, age is
not a significant predictor of personal fear.2
Beyond the vulnerability factors, both Models 1 and 2 of Table 3 reveal fairly consistent
political influences on personal fear. As expected, given Libertarians’ emphasis on rationality
over emotionality (e.g., Iyer et al., 2012), high scores on the Libertarian measure correspond to
lower levels of personal fear of COVID-19 (β = -.201). Also as expected, there is a significant
positive association between individualizing foundations and personal fear (β = .197). That is,
persons who value compassion and justice for others report greater personal worry about the
coronavirus, net of perceived risk and the controls. Unexpectedly, however, persons who score
high on binding foundations—those that emphasize respect for authority and ingroup loyalty—
also have elevated levels of personal worry about COVID-19 (β = .130).
Both models also show that news awareness is positively associated with personal fear (β
= .174). As predicted, attention to coronavirus-related news corresponds to increase levels of
personal worry about the virus. In addition, low levels of self-control correspond to heighted
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personal fear of COVID-19 (β = .108). Overall, Model 2 of Table 3 explains almost 30% of the
variation in personal fear of the coronavirus.
We see a similar pattern of associations in the regression of altruistic fear, presented in
Models 3 and 4 of Table 3. Perceived risk for others is significantly associated with heightened
altruistic fear (β = .105), although it is not the strongest predictor in the model. Neither gender
nor age are significant predictors of altruistic fear. While age is positively associated with
altruistic fear in Model 3, this effect does not hold net of perceived risk for others in Model 4,
and subsequent analyses did not support a mediation effect.3
Also similar to the case with personal fear, those identifying with Libertarian
perspectives tend to report lower levels of altruistic fear (β = -.118), and greater endorsements of
binding foundations and individualizing foundations both correspond to heightened levels of
altruistic fear (β = .167 and β = .286, respectively). News awareness is also positively associated
with altruistic fear (β = .172).
There are two notable differences, however, between the regressions of personal fear and
altruistic fear. First, although faith in Trump was not significantly associated personal fear, it is
a significant negative predictor of altruistic fear, net of perceived risk and the other variables (β =
-.118). Thus, persons with greater faith in Trump have lower levels of coronavirus-related fear
for others. This finding suggests the effect of Donald Trump as one that limits concern for
others. Second, whereas low self-control was a positive predictor of personal fear, it is a
negative predictor of altruistic fear (β = -.136), a competitive mediation effect revealed by the
inclusion of perceived risk for others in Model 4. Individuals with low self-control, then, fear for
themselves in regard to COVID-19, but once perceived risk is accounted for, fear less for others
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relative to those with greater self-control. Approximately 31% of the variation in altruistic fear
is explained by the predictors included in Model 4.
—Insert Table 3 about here—
We next examine mental health harm as an outcome of personal and altruistic fear, as
shown in Table 4. Overall, as expected, personal fear is positively associated with self-reported
reduced mental health (OR = 2.391), as shown in Model 2. However, altruistic fear of COVID19, net of personal fear and the other predictors, is not significantly associated with self-reported
mental health harm. Despite the indication in the fear of crime literature that altruistic fear may
be more consequential for well-being than personal fear (e.g., Warr & Ellison, 2000),
coronavirus-related fear for others does not appear to take the same psychological toll on
individuals as does fear for one’s own well-being.
Although we do not present specific hypotheses regarding mental health harm beyond the
influence of fear, Models 2 and 3 of Table 4 reveal that faith in Donald Trump is associated with
decreased odds of mental health harm (OR = .759), suggesting such faith may be a protective
factor.4 In contrast, news awareness (OR = 1.575) and perceived personal infection with
COVID-19 (OR = 5.056) are associated with increased odds of mental health harm. These
findings illustrate the magnification of stress through media consumption as well as the mental
health impact of believing one has experienced the disease itself.
Also, in accordance with longstanding patterns identified in mental health research
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990), women have a greater odds of mental health harm than men (OR =
1.417) and age is negatively associated with mental health harm (OR = .985) (Inaba et al., 2005).
Race is also a significant predictor of mental health harm, net of fear in Model 2, with the odds
of harm among Whites being 1.55 times those for non-Whites. This finding, together with the
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race effect on personal fear—that non-Whites experience greater personal fear (stress) than
Whites but Whites report greater mental health harm—is consistent with the race paradox found
in the mental health literature. Although non-Whites are, on average, exposed to more stressors
than Whites, they tend to report as good or better mental health (e.g., Mouzon, 2017).
The results reported in Table 4 also suggest some mediation effects, where the inclusion
of fear in Model 2 explains apparent effects in Model 1. Both personal perceived risk (OR =
1.189) and binding foundations (OR = 1.278) are associated with increased odds of mental health
harm in Model 1. Subsequent analyses using Hayes’s (2017) PROCESS procedure indicated that
the inclusion of personal fear in Model 2 fully mediated the relationship between perceived risk
and mental health harm; that is, perceived risk is linked to greater odds of mental health harm
because it is associated with heightened personal fear of COVID-19 (Sobel test Z = 4.95, P <
.000). The PROCESS analysis did not, however, indicate significant indirect effects of binding
foundations on mental health harm (Sobel test Z =. 397, p = .69).
—Insert Table 4 about here—
Discussion
At the time of this writing, with 3.3 million global cases of COVID-19 infection and
235,000 deaths, and over one million U.S. cases, resulting in over 64,000 U.S. deaths, it is clear
that the coronavirus pandemic is taking an unprecedented toll on populations around the world
(U.S. Department of Labor, 2020; John Hopkins, 2020). Given the potential pervasiveness of
fear in a crisis such as this, and the possible consequences of fearing too little or too much, this
study sought to understand (1) the extent to which Americans are worried about the coronavirus,
both for themselves and for others, (2) how the experience of personal and altruistic fear varies
within the population, and (3) the mental health consequences of excessive fear. In our effort to
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study these pandemic emotions, we developed models of personal and altruistic fear based on
insights from the fear of crime and terrorism literature as well as the political and moral context
of the pandemic. Our analyses make three key contributions to our understanding of COVID-19
and its impact: the findings (1) reveal the levels of both personal and altruistic fear among
Americans and how they correspond to patterns identified in the fear of crime literature, (2) show
the significance of the political and moral context in which Americans are experiencing the
COVID-19 pandemic, and (3) demonstrate the negative mental health outcomes associated with
COVID-19 fears.
Fear of COVID-19 in the United States
First, our survey showed that, to an overwhelming extent, our sample was worried about
COVID-19, both for themselves and for others. Most participants reported feeling personally
worried about all aspects of the virus, from being exposed to having long-term health problems
and dying. Conversely, only about 14% of the sample indicated that they were “not worried at
all” about dying from the virus—the most extreme consequence examined. To place these
personal fears in context, a 2018 national survey found 37.5% of its sample to be afraid of a
“pandemic or major epidemic” and 45% afraid of a terrorist attack. Furthermore, about 35% of
those respondents worried a lot about having a personal health crisis and 25% worried a lot about
being a victim of a violent crime (Haner et al., 2019). While not directly comparable, with
almost 78% of our sample worried about virus exposure and 61% reporting fear for their lives, it
appears that the gravity of the COVID-19 crisis has greatly increased levels of personal fear
within the U.S. population. We can expect that the extent of personal fear about the virus has
only increased among Americans as the reach of the pandemic grew substantially since the time
of the survey.
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Furthermore, in addition to fearing for themselves, most participants also worried often or
very often for numerous others including family members, the elderly, and doctors and nurses.
The heightened rate of fear about family we observed is consistent with the criminological
research’s focus on altruistic fear of crime for family members, which has been shown to have
significant behavioral (i.e., protective) consequences (Drakulich, 2015; Warr & Ellison, 2000).
Unlike the extant research on altruistic fear of crime, however, we included additional groups
about whom individuals may worry, specifically related to COVID-19. Given that the elderly
have been identified as an “at risk” population for COVID-19-related death, and doctors and
nurses are frontline personnel working with individuals who are infected, the relatively high
frequencies of worry about these groups is expected. Notably, however, altruistic fear dropped
substantially when participants were asked about neighbors and people in other countries.
Apparently, altruistic fear of COVID-19 is limited to those in our close personal circles—family
and elderly persons we know—and those putting their lives in danger to serve others (i.e.,
doctors and nurses). Americans seem to be much less concerned about their neighbors and
foreigners.
In addition, our analyses revealed that the vulnerability perspective on the fear of crime is
partially relevant to the fear of COVID-19. For example, race appears to matter, with Whites
being significantly less personally fearful of the virus than non-Whites. This race difference may
relate to reports of a racial disparity, with proportionately greater numbers of COVID-19
infections and deaths among African Americans and Hispanic/Latino persons relative to Whites
(CDC, 2020b). In addition, gender exerts an indirect effect on personal fear through perceived
risk. Consistent with social psychological models of the fear of crime, gender differences in fear
of COVID-19 are due to women’s heightened sense of risk victimization (i.e., dying from the
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virus) relative to men (Jackson, 2009). Aside from the effect of perceived risk for others, we do
not see the same patterns of vulnerability in the case of altruistic fear.
The Politics of Fear
Second, our results suggest that the coronavirus pandemic is a political and moral issue
and illustrate the applicability of Moral Foundations Theory to fear research more generally.
Although most research on the connections between MFT and emotion has focused on the classic
moral emotions of disgust, anger, and contempt (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Inbar et al., 2012),
our analyses indicate that fear of COVID-19 strikes a moral cord as well. Based on the
politicization of the situation and research that grounds political differences in diverging moral
foundations (Graham et al., 2009; Graham et al., 2013), we expected to find greater fear among
persons who endorse individualizing foundations and less fear among those who endorse binding
foundations. However, our analyses revealed that strength of moral judgements, both
individualizing and binding in nature, corresponds to heightened personal and altruistic fear of
COVID-19. In other words, the coronavirus is a concern—for self and others—for those who
value empathy and justice as well as those who merit loyalty, obedience, and purity. The
unexpected positive association between binding foundations and fear indicates the relevance of
group-level moral concerns about COVID-19 and may relate to the virus’s threat to the wellbeing of communities and the nation as a whole. Future research might probe the meaning of
these coronavirus-related concerns as they correspond to the different moral foundations.
Also, in a manner consistent with their documented unemotionality and emphasis on
rationality (Iyer et al., 2012), Libertarians reported significantly lower levels of both personal
and altruistic fear of COVID-19. In addition, we found that greater faith in Trump corresponded
to lower levels of altruistic fear. Thus, it appears that, while belief in the president does not
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lessen personal fear, such confidence does correspond to less concern about the welfare of others
regarding COVID-19. Conversely, this finding suggests the potential for the amplification of
fear for others under conditions of perceived governmental ineffectiveness (i.e., lowered faith in
the nation’s leadership), as seen in research on previous pandemics (Barrett & Brown, 2008;
Shultz et al., 2016; The Lancet, 2005).
The Consequences of Fear
Finally, this study demonstrates the negative mental health consequence of COVID-19
fear. Nearly 58% or our sample indicated that the stress of COVID-19 has had a negative impact
on their mental health. Our multivariate analyses further revealed that persons who report higher
levels of personal fear of COVID-19 have greater odds of self-reported mental health harm.
Following the stress process model (Pearlin & Bierman, 2013), fear signifies the experience of
stress corresponding to the macro-stressor of COVID-19. The consequence of increased stress is
increased psychological distress. Given the high levels of personal fear of COVID-19 observed
in our sample, this association is particularly concerning. Additional research may examine
potential moderators of the relationship between coronavirus fear and mental health, as resources
such as social support and coping skills may buffer the effects of stress (Pearlin & Bierman,
2013). In addition to personal fear, personal exposure to the coronavirus also corresponded to
decreased mental health. Thus, not only does the virus physically affect those who become
infected, experiencing the virus first-hand appears to lower the mental well-being of infected
individuals as well.
The same pattern does not hold for altruistic fear of COVID-19. Net of personal fear and
the other predictors, fear for others is not associated with self-reported declines in mental health.
The fear of crime literature indicates that altruistic fear may be more consequential for individual

28

well-being than personal fear, as it is associated with greater engagement in protective behaviors
that can influence the lives of oneself and others (e.g., purchasing a gun) (Warr & Ellison, 2000).
Although our analysis was limited to one measure of self-reported mental health harm, our
results suggest that only personal fear has a significant effect on mental health, at least in the
context of COVID-19.
We can offer some suggestions for why personal fear, in particular, is distressing for
Americans. The severe disruptions that COVID-19 has caused to the lifestyles of Americans and
its potential for even more severe consequences—quarantine, severe illness, long-term health
effects, and even death—is frightening. It may be the case that the unprecedented lifestyle
restrictions Americans are experiencing and the rapidly rising infections and death rates serve to
heighten the salience of the virus and its potential effects. Indeed, our results suggest, media
exposure (again, increasing the salience of COVID-19) contributes to mental health harm as
well. The virus’s pervasiveness has shown that it is something that everyone should be
concerned about. Furthermore, the impact of personal fear of COVID-19 may be exacerbated by
a lack of coping resources. As noted, social support can substantially lessen the negative mental
health impacts of stress (Thoits, 2011). With social distancing policies, access to social support
may be substantially limited. For example, we are unable to connect to others in-person or
physically comfort our friends and family members. This lack of support may exacerbate the
mental health impact of personal fear. Additional research may investigate how individuals can
obtain effective social support during this time of obligatory social distancing.
In contrast, we identified lowered odds of mental health harm among those with greater
faith in Trump. It may be the case that having faith in the nation’s leader provides some sense of
comfort. As prior research notes, confidence in the government’s ability to handle a pandemic is
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critical determinant of the outcomes of the pandemic on the population (Barrett & Brown, 2008;
Shultz et al., 2016; The Lancet, 2005). However, with Trump’s recent erroneous claims about
potential cures for COVID-19 (Rogers, Hauser, Yuhas, & Haberman, 2020), current levels of
such trust may be low. Indeed, a National Opinion Research Center poll reported on April 23,
2020 that only 23% of Americans have high levels of trust in the information the president
provides to the public regarding COVID-19 (Pace & Fingerhut, 2020).
Conclusion
Our findings provide initial insight into the experiences and outcomes of fear of the
coronavirus at the point in time of data collection (March 28th and 29th, 2020). However, they
must be considered in light of the limitations of our data. Following notable recent research
(Barnum & Solomon, 2019; Pickett et al., 2018; Silver, 2017), we utilized MTurk for our survey
distribution. Although this method of data collection enabled us to gather the experiences and
attitudes from a diverse sample of Americans with demographic characteristics fairly comparable
to those of the 2018 American Community Survey sample, at a critical point in time, the sample
is based on convenience rather than probability. Future data collection from national probability
samples is necessary to substantiate our findings and confirm their generalizability to the U.S.
population. Furthermore, longitudinal data are necessary to verify the causal order of the
associations that we identify, and, in particular, the long-term mental health impacts of the
COVID-19 crisis.
Nevertheless, our analyses have illustrated patterns in the emotional experiences
associated with COVID-19. Given that that data were collected rather early in the virus’s
timeline within the United States—virus related deaths in the U.S. went from 2,135 at the time of
the survey to 64,000 as of this writing—we can expect that COVID-19 related fear only
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continued to rise. For good reason, the public needs to feel concerned about the virus; however,
as indicated in previous research on fear as well as our analyses, excessive fear can have
negative consequences. Furthermore, a climate of fear has the potential to linger well after the
threat has been eradicated and to affect multiple domains of life—from the economy,
community, and social engagement to individual health. The high levels of fear noted in this
survey, early on in the crisis, suggest the origination of a climate of fear that could dominate
American society for quite some time. As implied by the stress process model, certain groups of
people—identified here as those with a heightened perception of risk, those that strongly endorse
moral foundations, and those who follow the news most closely—may face the greatest risk of
experiencing excessive fear.
Endnotes
In Warr’s (2000, p. 454) words, “there is no evidence that fear of crime is qualitatively different from
other forms of fear. What differentiates one from another is merely the object or stimulus of fear.”
1

2

We also ran the analyses with an age-squared term to test for a curvilinear relationship between age and
fear (Rader, 2017). Neither age nor age-squared were statistically significant predictors of fear in these
models.
3

Additional mediation analyses do not support a mediation effect of perceived risk on the relationships
between marital status and religion and altruistic fear (available upon request).
4

In an additional analysis, we tested for an interaction effect of personal fear and faith in Trump on
mental health harm. This coefficient was not statistically significant (b=-.078, se=.082, p=.925),
indicating that faith in Trump does not buffer the negative mental health consequence of extensive
personal fear.
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Table 1. Sample Descriptives (N = 990)
Correlations with Dependent Variables

Variable

Dependent Variables
Personal Fear
Altruistic Fear
Mental Health Harm (%)

Percent/
Mean (SD)

Range

2.92 (.79)
3.45 (.95)
57.58

Independent Variables
Female (%)
40.6
Age
38.37 (11.43)
White (%)
68.8
Perceived Risk/Personal
2.81 (1.79)
Perceived Risk/Others
4.00 (1.31)
Republican (%)
28.7
Conservative
2.69 (1.22)
Libertarian
0.34 (.38)
Faith in Trump
2.47 (1.40)
Binding Foundations
3.17 (.83)
Individualizing Foundations 3.99 (.62)
News awareness
3.56 (.59)
Control Variables
Education
Married (%)
Income
Religious (%)
South (%)
Low Self Control
Friends/Family Infected (%)
Personally Infected (%)

4.47 (1.26)
45.4
4.31 (1.51)
59.0
35.9
2.53 (.96)
18.18
11.52
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Personal
Fear

Altruistic
Fear

Mental
Health
Harm

1-4
1-5
0-1

-.619***
.384***

.619***
-.270***

.384***
.270***
--

0-1
19-79
0-1
1-7
1-7
0-1
1-5
0-1
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-4

.085**
-.006
-.130***
.349***
.350***
.002
-.088**
-.259***
.042
.231***
.310***
.250***

.122***
.082**
-.039
.214***
.277***
-.040
-.070*
-.237***
-.059
.207***
.424***
.282***

.090**
-.088**
-.040
.222***
.191***
.002
-.061
-.158***
-.003
.121***
.107**
.198***

1-7
0-1
1-7
0-1
0-1
1-5
0-1
0-1

.072*
.107**
-.048
.118***
.026
.189***
.087**
..066*

.029
.116***
-.010
.144***
.050
-.015
.044
.003

.122***
.084**
-.009
.070*
-.023
.214***
.193***
.226***

Table 2. Responses to Personal Fear and Altruistic Fear Items (N = 990)
Personal Fear

Thinking about the coronavirus, how worried are you
about each of the following?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Not worried
at all

Not too
worried

Somewhat
worried

Very
worried

Total
Worried

5.3
15.7
5.7
7.9
11.0
13.6

17.0
31.8
18.3
20.1
22.3
25.4

41.5
32.6
39.0
30.9
28.8
29.9

36.3
19.9
37.1
14.1
37.9
33.1

77.8
52.5
76.1
72.0
66.7
61.0

Very
rarely

Rarely

Sometimes

Often

Very
often

Total
Often

4.5
7.6
5.2
13.1
6.7
6.3
9.9

9.2
15.5
8.5
21.2
10.9
13.8
15.8

24.1
31.5
23.7
31.1
23.4
30.9
34.8

26.4
27.1
29.0
19.5
29.0
30.1
24.3

35.8
18.4
33.6
15.1
30.0
18.9
15.2

62.1
45.5
62.6
34.5
59.0
49.0
39.5

Being exposed to the virus
Having to quarantine after exposure
Becoming sick from the virus
Becoming seriously ill from the virus
Having long-term health problems due to the virus
Dying from the virus

Altruistic Fear
How often or rarely do you WORRY about the
coronavirus making the following people SICK?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Your family members
Your friends
Elderly people you know
Your neighbors
Doctors and nurses
People across America
7. People in other countries
Note: Some percentages may not equal to 100% due to rounding
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Table 3. OLS Regression Models for Personal Fear and Altruistic Fear (N = 990)
Personal Fear
b
Vulnerability Factors
Female
Age
White
Perceived Riska
Political Factors
Republican
Conservative
Libertarian
Faith in Trump
Binding Foundations
Individualizing
Foundations
News Awareness
News awareness
Control Variables
Education
Married
Income
Religious
South
Low Self Control
Friends/Family Infected
Personally Infected
Adjusted R Squared

Model 1
SE

β

Altruistic Fear
b

Model 2
SE

β

b

Model 3
SE

β

b

Model 4
SE

β

.091*
.004
-.148**
--

.046
.002
.050
--

.057
.058
-.087
--

.059
.001
-.120*
.117***

.044
.002
.048
.013

.037
.009
-.071
.266

.076
.005*
-.058
--

.054
.003
.059
--

.039
.064
-.028
--

.044
.006
-.014
.144***

.053
.002
.058
.021

.023
.074
-.007
.198

.074
-.028
-.476***
.006
.130***
.243***

.066
.025
.068
.026
.037
.040

.043
-.043
-.230
.010
.138
.194

.038
-.012
-.417***
.044
.122**
.248***

.064
.024
.066
.025
.036
.038

.022
-.019
-.201
.008
.130
.197

.050
.023
-.459***
-.078*
.219***
.443***

.078 .024
.029 .029
.081 -.183
.030 -.116
.044 .191
.047 .219

.065
.033
-.415***
-.080**
.191***
.436***

.076
.029
.079
.030
.043
.046

.031
.043
-.165
-.118
.167
.286

.253***

.038

.190

.231***

.037

.174

.304***

.276***

.045

.172

-.009
.078
-.038*
.013
-.014
.129***
-.002
-.074

.020
.050
.016
.053
.046
.030
.069
.086

-.015
.050
-.073
.008
-.009
.159
-.001
-.030

.019
.049
.016
.052
.045
.030
.067
.083

-.012
.032
-.048
-.027
-.020
.108
-.024
-.062

.023
.058
.019
.062
.054
.035
.080
.099

-.022
.057
-.029
.035
.008
-.071
.019
-.006

.242

-.008
.051
-.025
-.043
-.033
.088**
-.048
-.152

.296

-.023
.121*
-.024
.129*
.032
-.043
.051
.016

.045

.189

.023 -.030
.059 .063
.019 -.039
.063 .067
.055 .016
.036 -.043
.082 .021
.101 .005
.276

-.017
.110
-.018
.068
.017
-.070*
.047
-.017

.309

Note: * p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 aThe regression of personal fear includes perceived personal risk; the regression of altruistic fear includes perceived risk for others.
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Table 4. Logistic Regression Models for Mental Health Harm (N = 990)
Mental Health Harm

Fear of COVID-19
Personal Fear
Altruistic Fear
Vulnerability Factors
Female
Age
White
Perceived Risk
Political Factors
Republican
Conservative
Libertarian
Faith in Trump
Binding Foundations
Individualizing
Foundations
News Awareness
News awareness
Control Variables
Education
Married
Income
Religious
South
Low Self Control
Friends/Family
Infected
Personally Infected

b

Model 1
SE

---

---

OR
---

b

Model 2
SE

.872***
.165

OR

.135
.112

2.391
1.179

.432**
-.013
.287
.173***

.151
.007
.166
.047

1.541
.987
1.332
1.189

.426**
-.015*
.437*
.054

.158
.007
.173
.050

1.531
.985
1.548
1.056

.175
.053
-.536*
-.244**
.245*
.169

.224
.087
.219
.084
.119
.131

1.191
1.054
.585
.783
1.278
1.184

.148
.066
-.125
-.275**
.120
-.118

.232
.090
.237
.088
.128
.145

1.160
1.068
.883
.759
1.128
.888

.683***

.128

1.979

.454**

.137

1.575

.083
.050
-.051
-.299
-.121
.370***
.292

.064
.164
.052
.172
.152
.101
.235

1.086
1.051
.950
.742
.886
1.448
1.339

.099
-.007
-.027
-.298
-.100
.334**
.358

.067
.171
.054
.180
.159
.108
.243

1.104
.993
.973
.743
.905
1.396
1.431

1.421***

.360

4.410

1.621***

.371

5.056

Cox & Snell R Square
Note: * p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

.179

.238
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Appendix: Survey Items
_____________________________________________________________________________
Variable

Measure

Libertarianism
Which of these statements comes CLOSEST to your view?
a. The main reason government has become bigger over the years is because it has
gotten involved in things that people should do for themselves.
b. Government has become bigger because the problems we face have become bigger.
Which of these statements comes CLOSEST to your view?
a. We need the government to handle today’s complex economic problems.
b. The free market can handle these problems without government being involved.
Which of these statements comes CLOSEST to your view?
a. There are more things that the government should be doing.
b. The less government, the better.
Faith in Trump
How much you agree or disagree with each of the following:
Response options: Strongly disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly
Agree.
1. I believe that President Trump will make America great again.
2. President Trump is 100% correct that we need a wall to make sure that gang members,
criminals, and rapists do not come into the U.S.
3. President Trump is the only politician who really cares about the common man.
4. President Trump knows how to protect America against threats from around the world.
5. I love President Trump’s style because he is strong and tells it like it is.
Binding Foundations
How much you agree or disagree with each of the following:
Response options: Strongly disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly
Agree.
Purity/Sanctity (α = .924)
1. People should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed.
2. Some acts are wrong simply because they are disgusting.
3. I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural.
4. Some acts are wrong simply because they violate the standards of purity and decency.
Authority/Respect (α = .859)
1. Respect for authority is something all children need to learn.
2. When the government makes laws, those laws should always respect the
traditions and heritage of the country.
3. People should never curse the founders or early heroes of their country.
4. People should never disrespect their bosses, teachers, or professors.
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Ingroup/Loyalty (α = .721)
1. People should always put their group’s interests above their own personal interests.
2. Loyalty to one’s group is more important than one’s individual concerns.
3. The government should strive to improve the well-being of people in our nation,
even if it sometimes happens at the expense of people in other nations.
4. I would never turn a family member in for committing a crime.
Individualizing Foundations
How much you agree or disagree with each of the following:
Response options: Strongly disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly
Agree.
Harm/Care (α = .639)
1. If I saw a mother slapping her child, I would be outraged.
2. It can never be right to kill a human being.
3. Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue.
4. The government must first and foremost protect all people form harm.
Fairness/Reciprocity (α = .775)
1. If a friend wanted to cut in with me on a long line, I would feel uncomfortable
because it wouldn’t be fair to those behind me.
2. Justice, fairness, and equality are the most important requirements for a society.
3. When the government makes laws, the number one principal should be ensuring
that everyone is treated fairly.
4. People should always treat others fairly and equally.
Low Self-Control
Thinking about yourself, how much do you agree or disagree with each of the following
statements?
Response options: Strongly disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly
Agree.
1. I often act on the spur of the moment without stopping to think.
2. I often do whatever brings me pleasure here and now, even at the cost of some distant
goal.
3. I frequently try to avoid projects that I know will be difficult.
4. I try to look out for myself first, even if it means making things difficult for other
people.
5. I lose my temper pretty easily.
6. When I’m really angry, other people better stay away from me.
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